CMSC 426 Principles of Computer Security

Lecture 19 Offensive Security and Hardening

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Today's Topics

- Offensive security
 - What it is
 - Attacker Lifecycle
 - Common tools
- Demo
- Effective Windows Hardening

Offensive Security

What is Offensive Security?

- Subset of the security field
 - Focuses on assessing the security of machines or networks by attempting to attack them
- Goal is to be proactive rather than reactive
 - We've previously talked about figuring out who launched an attack, or tracing them back to their source
 - Much easier to prevent it in the first place
- The best defense is a good offense!



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1: Reconnaissance

- "Knowing your target"
- Involves gathering information about the target
 Can often be collected without the target detecting it
- Technical information
 - Network information from scanning, etc.



1: Reconnaissance (continued)

- Business information
 - OSINT (Open Source INTelligence)
 - Going to a company's website, github, trello board, etc.
 - Information about employees, positions, technology they use
 - Real examples: passwords in code comments, keys committed to github



Goal is to get information you can use to get in

1.5: Enumeration

- Goal in this stage is to identify exactly what versions of which services are running
- Look for known exploits and vulnerabilities for those specific versions
- Are there common misconfigurations which show up a lot with these specific technologies?
- How do you test for these misconfigurations?

2: Compromise

- Actually breaking into machines, often what people think about when they think of "hacking"
 - Not actually that exciting though
- It only takes one weak link to own an enterprise
 - Phishing emails, infected document downloads
 - Why client-side exploits are still a thing

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3: Persistence

 After you initially gain access into a network, you want to make sure you can always get back in

- This doesn't just mean in 5 minutes, it means days, weeks, or months later
- Ideally even after reboots, resets, etc.

4: Post Exploitation

- This is what separates the skilled attackers from everyone else
- What can you do with your access?
 - Can you escalate privileges on your local machine?
 - What is accessible within the network?
 - □ Can you get access to file servers, internal source code, documents?
 - Can you get access to other users' machines?
 - Can you elevate your privileges on a network level?
 - To Domain Administrator?
 - □ How easy is it to stay undetected?

Tools and Attacks

Metasploit

- Open source attack framework, written in Ruby
 - Can be used to write and launch own exploits
 - Managing different sessions
 - Escalating privileges
 - Covers basically everything you would need
- Very much a "point-and-click tool"



Using Metasploit

- Walks you through the major steps in launching an attack
 - Choosing and setting up an exploit
 - Checking to see if the target is vulnerable
 - Choosing and configuring a payload
 - Choosing the encoding and evasion techniques for the payload
 - Launching the attack
 - Handling the connections
 - This one is particularly useful

Recap: LSA and LSASS

- LSA (Local Security Authority)
 - Windows subsystem responsible for managing authentication and local security policy
- LSASS (LSA Subsystem Service)
 - The process in which LSA runs
 - Responsible for providing single sign-on functionality in Windows
- Does this by caching credentials in memory
 Why is this bad?

Mimikatz

- Tool which can dump Windows passwords (and other things) from the memory
 - For <u>every user</u> who logged in since the last boot
- (This should scare you)



"Passing" Attacks

"Passing" Attacks

- Pass the Hash and Pass the Ticket
- Goal of both attacks is to impersonate another user
 Pass the Hash: specifically, password hashes
 Pass the Ticket: Kerberos tickets
- Allows attacker to
 - Gain access to new info and systems
 - Hide their tracks (and prevent discovery)

How a Pass the Hash Attack Works

- Using a stolen password hash in place of the actual password
 (*e.g.*, obtained through Mimikatz)
- Want to authenticate as a user without having access to their plaintext password(s)
 - □ Fortunately, NTLM hashes are often just as good as passwords
 - □ Lots of Windows functions will accept a hash in place of a password
- Newer systems store just the hash in memory
 Older systems store both the hash and the plaintext (yay?)

Exploiting a Pass the Hash Attack

- Can now be used for lateral movement or spawning processes
 - Connecting to other systems using that same user account/password
 Launching processes under another account name
- Launching has two benefits:
 - The launching of the application/process cannot be easily traced back to the person who actually launched it, just the username who did so
 - Other users may have more privileges

How a Pass the Ticket Attack Works

- Hacker validates themselves as a specific user by presenting a Kerberos ticket (TGT or SGT) to the system
- Grab another user's cached Kerberos ticket (still valid)
 Use that ticket as your own, with that user's privileges
 Kerberos makes use of NTLM hashes on Windows machines
- Why does this work? Doesn't Kerberos verify ticket validity?
 There's a 20-minute window after creation where this doesn't happen

Three Types of Tickets

- Regular Ticket
 - Intercepted tickets meant for another user
 - May have higher privileges than attacker does
- "Silver" Tickets (Service-Granting Ticket)
 - Forged ticket for specific services
 - □ Lets the attacker "write their own" ticket for that specific service
- "Golden" Tickets (Ticket-Granting Ticket)
 - Forged ticket for essentially anything
 - Lets the attacker "write their own" ticket for anything

"Fancy" Tickets

- Silver tickets
 - Requires the Service Account password hash
- Golden tickets
 - Requires the KRBTGT (Kerberos TGT) password hash
 - Allows the attacker to sort of "impersonate" the AS
 - Means they can write a ticket for any service on any machine for any user
 - Including users that don't exist in the system
- Only way to remove a golden ticket's effectiveness:
 - □ Change password *twice* (keeps old password for older tickets)

DEMO TIME!!!